In this paper we investigate certain systems of propositional intuitionistic modal logic defined semantically in terms of neighborhood structures. We discuss various restrictions imposed on those frames but our constant approach is to discard superset axiom. Such assumption allows us to think about specific modalities ∆, ∇ and new functor depending on the notion of maximal neighborhood. We show how it is possible to treat our models as bi-relational ones.
Introduction
Our general purpose is to establish sound and complete neighborhood semantics for propositional intuitionistic modal logic. Moreover, we want to investigate and describe some fundamental properties of structures achieved. Basically, we follow the standard path, speaking about the universe W of possible worlds. We assume that each world w has its minimal and maximal neighborhood. The former simulates intuitionistic reachability of other worlds; the latter refers to the modal visibility (and can be properly contained in W , i.e. there is no superset axiom).
Such approach allows us also to think about specific modality ∆, behaving in maximal neighborhood partially like necessity. Also we discuss ∇ -possibility operator which is not dual to ∆. We show which well-known modal axioms hold for those operators and which are rejected.
Later, we introduce new functor of implication ( ) depending on the notion of maximal neighborhood. There can also be established certain correspondence between maximal neighborhoods and topological spaces. Even more interesting is bi-relational point of view. In this setting, we prove finite model property. As for completeness results, we propose canonical models based on prime theories. It should be stated out that fmp and completeness are obtained only for the mono-modal case (in the language containing single modal operator, that of necessity).
After those intuitionistic considerations, we present few classical modal systems with two operators: and ∆. While ∆ still refers to the satisfaction of formula in the whole maximal neighborhood, describes necessity in minimal neighborhood. We obtain completeness results for those systems and the we show how to establish translation between one of them and our initial intuitionistic modal logic.
Alphabet and language
Our basic system is named IML1. It has rather standard syntax (i.e. alphabet and language). We use the following notations:
1. P V is a fixed denumerable set of propositional variables p, q, r, s, ... 3. The only derived connective is ¬ (which means that ¬ϕ is a shortcut for ϕ → ⊥).
Formulas are generated recursively in a typical way: if ϕ, ψ are wff 's then also ϕ∨ψ, ϕ∧ψ, ϕ → ψ and ∆ϕ. Semantical interpretation of propositional variables and all the connectives introduced above will be presented in the next section. Attention: ⇐, ⇒ and ⇔ are used only on the level of meta-language (which is obviously classical).
Neighborhood semantics 2.1 Foundations of neighborhood semantics
Neighborhood semantics for (classical) modal logics was introduced by Montague (1968) , Scott (1970) and Segerberg (1968) . Nowadays it is still investigated (see interesting surveys by Pacuit [6] and Shehtman [8] ). The main idea is that we have model M = W, N , V where N : W → P (P (W )) is so-called neighborhood function and V : P V → P (W ) is valuation. Each world has its (possibly empty) family of neighborhoods (which are just subsets of universe W ). Standard interpretation of modal operators is shown below: w ϕ ⇔ there is U ∈ N w such that for every v ∈ U we have v ϕ
The main advantage of neighborhood semantics is that it guarantees completeness results even for very weak modal logics (in particular, for non-regular and non-monotonic systems). The only condition is that E ⊆ L. E is the weakest classical modal logic and it contains only instances of classical propositional axioms, duality axiom ( ϕ ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ), rule modus ponens and the rule of extensionality RE (ϕ ↔ ψ ⇒ ϕ ↔ ψ).
As for the neighborhood semantics for intuitionistic logic, it has been presented by Moniri and Maleki in [4] . They have also considered simple subintuitionistic case of BPL (Basic Propositional Logic).
The definition of structure
Definition 2.1. Our basic structure is a neighborhood frame (nIML1-frame) defined as an ordered pair W, N where:
1. W is a non-empty set (of worlds, states or points)
2. N is a function from W into P (P (W )) such that: 
Valuation and model
Definition 2.2. Neighborhood nIML1-model is a triple W, N , V , where W, N is an nIML1-frame and V is a function from P V into P (W ) satisfying the following condition: if w ∈ V (q) then
Definition 2.3. Forcing of formulas in a world w ∈ W is defined inductively:
1. w q ⇔ w ∈ V (q) for any q ∈ P V 2. w ϕ → ψ ⇔ N w ⊆ {v ∈ W ; v ϕ or v ψ}.
3. w ¬ϕ ⇔ w ϕ → ⊥ ⇔ N w ⊆ {v ∈ W ; v ϕ} 4. w ∆ϕ ⇔ N w ⊆ {v ∈ W ; v ϕ}.
w ⊥
The reader could say that the symbol ∆ is redundant and that typical would be appropriate. In fact, in intuitionistic modal systems is often defined just like our modality (albeit in bi-relational or algebraic setting). In other words, necessity of ϕ in a given world w means that ϕ is accepted in all worlds which are modally visible (reacheable) from w. We understand such objection but later we will use symbol for different goals.
There is also one technical annotation: sometimes we will write X ϕ where X would be a subset of W , in particular -minimal or maximal neighborhood (e.g. N w ϕ). Clearly it would mean that each element of X forces ϕ.
As usually, we say that formula ϕ is satisfied in a model M = W, N , V when w ϕ for every w ∈ W . It is true (tautology) when it is satisfied in each nIML1-model.
Equivalent definitions of →-and ∆-conditions
Lemma 2.1. →-condition is equivalent to the following property:
there is r ∈ N u such that r / ∈ X. But if u ∈ N w then N u ⊆ N w ⊆ X. Then r ∈ X -and this is our expected contradiction.
⇐
Assume that u ∈ N w for certain w ∈ W . Of course N u ⊆ N u and then (by the assumption)
Lemma 2.2. ∆-condition is equivalent to the following property:
Suppose that there is w ∈ W such that N w ⊆ X. Put Y = {v ∈ W ; N v ⊆ X} and assume that N w Y . Then we have u ∈ N w such that u / ∈ Y . Thus there is r ∈ N u such that r / ∈ X.
But (by ∆-condition) N u ⊆ N w ⊆ X and this is contradiction.
Let u ∈ N w . We can always say that
Then of course N u ⊆ N w .
Monotonicity of forcing in minimal neighborhood
The following theorem is crucial for the intuitionistic aspect of our logic. It is analogous to the theorem about monotonicity of forcing in relational semantics. Note that we do not have such property for maximal neighborhoods.
Proof. For ∧ and ∨ this proof goes by induction over the complexity of formulas -but for → we must use →-condition and for ∆ we need ∆-condition. Details are listed below.
1. w q. Our expected conclusion is immediate (from the very definition of valuation).
2. w ϕ → ψ. It means that N w ⊆ {z ∈ W ; z ϕ or z ψ}. On the other side we can write
this clearly gives us (by →-condition and Lemma 2.1) that N w ⊆ V (ϕ → ψ).
3. w ∆ϕ. This means that N w ⊆ Y = {v ∈ W ; v ϕ}. On the other side, V (∆ϕ) = {s ∈ W ; s ∆ϕ} = {s ∈ W ; N s ⊆ Y }. Now assume that N w V (∆ϕ). Then there exists x ∈ N w such that x / ∈ V (∆ϕ). Now we have y ∈ N x such that y ϕ. But
. This is plain contradiction.
Importance of ∆-condition
Without ∆-condition Theorem 1 would be impossible. We can easily find a counter-example.
Let us treat v as an element of minimal w-neighborhood. Monotonicity theorem would imply that v ∆ϕ (just like w). But v ∆ϕ because of z which belongs to maximal v-neighborhood and does not force ϕ. Note that z / ∈ N w so N v N w . Thus, ∆-condition is not satisfied. 
Intuitionistic and modal axioms
One can easily check that purely intuitionistic axioms are satisfied in our system. In fact, someone familiar with intuitionistic calculus, Kripke models and upsets will quickly perceive this fact, having in his mind →-condition and monotonicity theorem. Now a natural question arises: which well-known modal axioms and rules are satisfied in our logic? The answer is below.
Suppose that there is nIML1-model W, N , V with an element w ∈ W such that w K. This means that there exists z ∈ N w which forces ∆(ϕ → ψ) but does not accept ∆ϕ → ∆ψ. So for every x ∈ N z , x ϕ → ψ which means that for every y ∈ N x we have y ϕ or y ψ.
On the other side there exists certain v ∈ N z accepting ∆ϕ but not ∆ψ. Then N v ϕ -but there is also r ∈ N v such that r ψ.
But if v is in minimal z-neighborhood, then N v ⊆ N z (from ∆-condition). This means that r ∈ N z . Then r ϕ or r ψ -although we said that r ϕ and r ψ. Clearly this is a contradiction.
T: ∆ϕ → ϕ.
Obviously this condition is always satisfied (because each element w of our universe is contained in its minimal -and thus also maximal -neighborhood).
MP (modus ponens)
Suppose that this rule is not satisfied. Then we have W, w ∈ W such that w does not force certain ψ although each point forces ϕ → ψ and ϕ (for certain ϕ). In particular, w ϕ or w ψ -but w ϕ, so w ψ. Contradiction.
RN (necessity rule): ϕ ⇒ ∆ϕ
This condition is satisfied. Suppose the opposite, i.e. that there are W, w ∈ W and ϕ such that w ∆ϕ although each point forces ϕ. Now it means that there is v ∈ N w such that v ϕ.
Contradiction because ϕ is forced everywhere in W .
At this moment we can stop our considerations because only this package of axioms will be later used in completeness proof. However, we can point out that also the following rules are valid:
Below we see some typical modal formulas which are not true in our environment.
4: ∆ϕ → ∆∆ϕ
Note that axiom 4 becomes true if we put the following restriction on our frames:
In a bi-relational setting we could say that this is just transitivity of modal visibility (see [5] for comparison).
2. B: ϕ → ¬∆¬∆ϕ
It is easy to find counter-examples. Our logic is rather weak. We can say that that IML1 is just IPC with modal axioms K, T, and rules MP, RN. Of course we also hold that IML1 is a set of formulas which are true in all those structures which we called nIML1-models. Thus we need completeness theorem.
Canonical model and completeness
In this section we show how to obtain completeness of system IML1 with respect to neighborhood semantics. Canonical frames and models seem to be a natural tool for proving such results. At first, let us introduce some basic definitions and lemmas.
Definition 4.1. We define IML1-theory in a standard manner: as a set of well-formed formulas which contains all axioms and is closed under deduction (i.e. under modus ponens and modal rule RN).
Attention: later we shall omit symbols IML1 and nIML1 for convenience. Speaking informally for a moment, the reader should just remember that in this section everything happens with respect to IML1 logic and nIML1-models.
Lemma 4.1. (see [3] , Lemma A.1.) If w is a theory then ϕ → ψ ∈ w ⇔ ψ ∈ v for all theories v such that w ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ v.
Proof. ⇒
This direction is simple. Assume that ϕ → ψ ∈ w. Let us consider theory v such that w∪{ϕ} ⊆ v.
Then ϕ ∈ v and ϕ → ψ ∈ v. By modus ponens we get ψ ∈ v.
⇐
Suppose that v = {δ; ϕ → δ ∈ w}. Now we can say that w ⊆ v because: if µ ∈ w, then w ϕ → µ (from intuitionistic axiom). Thus ϕ → µ ∈ w (because theory is by definition deductively closed).
So µ ∈ v. Also w ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ v because ϕ → ϕ ∈ w and hence ϕ ∈ v. Then ψ ∈ v so by the very
Note that the lemma above can be considered as a semantic version of deduction theorem. It is important, because in modal logic we cannot use typical syntactic form. For example, it is impossible to transform necessity rule into axiom ϕ → ∆ϕ. More precisely, acceptance of such claim would lead us to trivial logic in which ∆ would be useless. Of course, our analogue of deduction theorem holds not only for IML1. In fact, it is much more general.
In the next point we introduce the notion of prime theory, repeating standard definition from intuitionistic calculus.
Definition 4.2.
A theory w is said to be prime if it satisfies the following conditions:
Lemma 4.2. Each consistent theory w γ (not containing formula γ) can be extended to the prime theory w γ .
Proof. We can extend w γ to the relatively maximal theory w γ using standard method for countable languages or even applying Lindenbaum's lemma based on Kuratowski-Zorn lemma. What is important, is to check that this new theory, established in this process, is actually prime. We will omit subscript γ if the context provides sufficient clarity.
Suppose that ϕ ∈ w or ψ ∈ w . Then we can use well-known tautologies ϕ → (ϕ ∨ ψ) and ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ) to get our expected result (by modus ponens).
This direction was simple but the second one is slightly more complicated. At first, let us introduce the notion of X -deductive closure of X, where X is a set of formulas. Now assume that ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ w but ϕ / ∈ w and ψ / ∈ w . Consider γ (i.e. formula for which w is relatively maximal) and then think about w ∪ {ϕ} and w ∪ {ψ}. We show that γ ∈ w ∪ {ϕ} (and the same for w ∪ {ψ}).
Suppose the opposite: that γ / ∈ w ∪ {ϕ}. Then we can consider T h γ , ⊆ -the set of all theories without γ. Clearly, w ⊆ w ∪ {ϕ} and moreover w = w ∪ {ϕ} (because of ϕ, for example). But at the same time w ∪ {ϕ} ∈ T h γ so w cannot be maximal in T h γ (contradiction). Hence, γ ∈ w ∪ {ϕ}.
Thus γ ∈ v for all theories v such that w ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ v. Of course w ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ w ∪ {ϕ}. Now we can use the deduction theorem and say that ϕ → γ ∈ w .
The same reasoning can be repeated for ψ. Then we use intuitionistic axiom to say that ϕ ∨ ψ → γ ∈ w and (by modus ponens) we get that γ ∈ w which is false.
Now we can introduce the notion of canonical model. 1. W is the set of all prime theories.
2. Neighborhood function for canonical model is a mapping N : W → P (P (W )) such that
3. V is a valuation defined in standard manner, i.e. as a function V : P V → P (W ) such that
Note that minimal w-neighborhood is just a collection of all supertheories of given theory w. In case of maximal w-neighborhood we simply take everything what we need, saying colloquially. As for the valuation, it satisfies our expected intuitionistic condition: if w ∈ V (q) then N w ⊆ V (q). Proof. We must check conditions from the definition of frame:
1. w ∈ N w . This restriction holds by the very definition of N w as a collection of supersets of theories.
2. N w ∈ N w . The answer is positive because N w ⊆ N w and N w ⊆ N w . The first inclusion is obvious, so we must check the second one. Suppose that z ∈ N w . Then (as we shall show below) ∆-condition holds, i.e. N z ⊆ N w . Now assume that ∆ϕ ∈ z. Recall that z is theory so it contains modal axiom T which says that ∆ϕ → ϕ. Thus (by modus ponens) ϕ ∈ z. Then z ∈ N z which gives us that z ∈ N w .
3. N w ⊆ X ⊆ N w ⇒ X ∈ N w . Relative superset axiom holds by the very definition of canonical neighborhood function.
This condition also holds. Suppose that v ∈ N w . Now take
So we have u ∈ N v which does not belong to N w .
Thus, if ∆ϕ ∈ v then ϕ ∈ u but at the same time we can find certain ψ such that ∆ψ ∈ w and
Now we must show the so-called fundamental theorem, typical for any proof of canonical completeness. Proof. The proof goes by the induction over the complexity of formulas. We have two really important cases: → and ∆.
1. Consider ϕ := γ → ψ.
⇒
By contraposition assume that γ → ψ / ∈ w. Deduction theorem and extension lemma allow us
By induction hypothesis, v γ and v ψ. Hence, w γ → ψ.
⇐
Suppose that γ → ψ ∈ w. Assume that N w ⊆ {v ∈ W : v γ}. By induction γ ∈ w. Now take arbitrary u ∈ N w . By the definition of minimal w-neighborhood we have w ⊆ u. Thus γ → ψ ∈ u. This gives us that γ ∈ u and γ → ψ ∈ u. By modus ponens ψ ∈ u so we can say
then ψ / ∈ {γ : ∆γ ∈ w}. We designate this last set as ∆ −1 w. It is, in particular, a theory of IML1. Check this: let δ → ξ ∈ ∆ −1 w and δ ∈ ∆ −1 w. Then ∆(δ → ξ) ∈ w and ∆δ ∈ w.
Because of K axiom we can say that ∆ξ ∈ w -so ξ ∈ ∆ −1 w. We have shown that ∆ −1 is closed on modus ponens. Now check RN rule. Let ξ ∈ ∆ −1 w. This gives us that ∆ξ ∈ w. But w is already a theory, so it holds RN. Thus ∆∆ξ ∈ w. From this ∆ξ ∈ ∆ −1 w.
Now we can go back to the main part of the proof. By extension lemma we can find prime theory u such that ∆ −1 w ⊆ u and ψ / ∈ u. Moreover, u ∈ N w -because if not, then there would be formula γ such that ∆γ ∈ w and γ / ∈ u. But this would mean that γ ∈ ∆ −1 w and then γ ∈ u (because, as we said, ∆ −1 w ⊆ u).
Finally, we have established u ∈ N u such that ψ / ∈ u which means -by induction hypothesis -that u ϕ. Thus w ∆ψ, i.e. w ϕ.
Suppose that w ∆ψ. So there exists v ∈ N w such that v ψ. By induction hypothesis ψ / ∈ v. It follows that ∆ψ / ∈ w. Suppose the opposite: if ∆ψ ∈ w then from the definition of
(Completeness) Now our method is standard. Suppose that w is a theory and w ϕ. In particular this means that ϕ / ∈ w. Then we can extend w to the relatively prime theory v such that w ⊆ v and ϕ / ∈ v. Then for each ψ ∈ w, v ψ and v ϕ. The last statement means in particular that ϕ is not a semantical consequence of w.
5 Bi-relational point of view
Structure and model
Although we believe that neighborhood language is quite comfortable to speak about intuitionistic modal logic (especially if we are interested mainly in minimal and maximal neighborhoods), it is possible to treat our models as bi-relational ones. In fact, this approach is very typical tool for mathematicians working upon modal logics based on intuitionistic core.
It is not difficult to imagine how should the proper bi-relational IML1-semantics look like. Below we present essential formalisation.
is a non-empty set (of worlds), ≤ is a partial order on W × W and R is a binary relation on W × W such that:
Alternatively, we can say that R is reflexive and clause 2) holds. The reader can suspect that the second clause is analogous to the ∆-condition in neighborhood frame. Of course this is true, as we shall see later. Now let us define the notion of brIML1-model.
where W, ≤, R is a brIML1-frame and V is a function from P V into P (W ) satisfying the following
Definition 5.3. Forcing of formulas in a world w ∈ W is defined inductively in a manner typical for relational (Kripke) models. The only case which is untypical and requires use of relation R is the modal case.
Proof. The proof goes by induction and the only case which is important, is modal case. Suppose that w ∆ψ. Take v ∈ W such that w ≤ v. Now suppose that vRu. It means that wRu. But if ∆ψ is accepted in w (as we assumed) then ψ is accepted in each x ∈ W such that wRx (by the definition of forcing). Thus, u ψ and then v ∆ϕ.
As we could see, clause 2 from the definition of brIML1-frame was crucial for this proof -just like ∆-condition was crucial for the analogous proof in neighborhood environment.
In fact, our class of brIML1-frames (models) is identical with a class of condensed H frames (models), introduced by Bozic and Dosen in [1] . They have obtained completeness result but (basically) with respect to slightly different axiomatic. Precisely, they used modal axioms ∆ϕ ∧ ∆ψ → ∆(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆(ϕ → ϕ) and the rule ϕ → ψ ∆ϕ → ∆ψ. To avoid ambiguity, we present those theorems with ∆, although it is clear that they used typical symbol.
Now we can establish translations between neighborhood and bi-relational models. In other words, we show that it is possible to change our point of view, preserving frame properties and forcing of formulas. The fact that the same formulas are true in every world of each model based on given universe is named pointwise equivalency. Proof. Let us define (for each w ∈ W ) two sets:
From bi-relational to neighborhood model
Let us check five properties of neighborhood frame:
1. w ∈ N w -this condition is satisfied just because w ≤ w.
2. N w ∈ N w -this condition is satisfied. Of course we must show that N w ⊆ N w . Suppose
4. N w ⊆ X ⊆ N w ⇒ X ∈ N w -this is obvious (by the very definition of N ).
5. u ∈ N w ⇒ N u ⊆ N w -this is ∆-condition. Assume that u ∈ N w , i.e. w ≤ u. Let v ∈ N u which means that uRv. Then, by the definition of R, we have also that wRv. Hence,
Pointwise equivalency can be proved by induction on the construction of formula. In fact, it is quite obvious if we remember about strict correspondence between minimal (maximal) neighborhoods and relations ≤, R. Moreover, we did not change valuation, preparing neighborhood model, so in each world the same propositional variables are accepted. Proof. Let us define two relations on W × W , ≤ and R:
It is easy to show that ≤ is actually a preorder. Let us check two conditions which combine ≤ with R.
1. ∀w, v ∈ W w ≤ v ⇒ wRv -this condition is satisfied because minimal w-neighborhood is contained in the maximal one.
2. ∀w, v, u ∈ W w ≤ v ⇒ (vRu ⇒ wRu) -this condition is satisfied because of ∆-condition.
Suppose that w ≤ v and vRu. Thus v ∈ N w and u ∈ N v . But N v ⊆ N w so wRu.
The last thing is pointwise equivalency. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of formulas.
Finite model property
In this section we show that IML1 logic has finite model property. We achieve this result by means of filtration, working in bi-relational framework (although it would be possible to use neighborhood environment). Check Hashimoto [2] and Takano [10] to study other examples of such approach in intuitionistic modal logic. Attention: we omit superscript ≤,R later in this subsection, when speaking about bi-relational frames.
Definition 5.4. Consider brIML1-model M = W, ≤, R, V and formula γ which is not tautology, i.e. there exists w ∈ W such that w γ. Let us define: Σ = Sub(γ), which means that Σ is the set of all subformulas of γ.
Definition 5.5. We define the equivalence relation ∼ on W as follows: w ∼ v iff w α ⇔ v α for every α ∈ Σ. We denote by [w] the equivalence class of an element w.
Definition 5.6. Filtered brIML1-frame F Σ = W, ≤ Σ , R Σ is defined as follows:
Of course W Σ is finite (because Σ is finite). But we must assure that we obtained proper brIML1-structure. Fortunately, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3. Filtered frame F Σ , defined as above, is a well-defined brIML1-frame.
Proof. We must check three conditions:
1. ≤ Σ is pre-order. This is almost obvious.
and w ∆β where ∆β ∈ Σ. Thus v ∆β.
But then v β which gives us our expected result.
. Now assume that w ∆β, ∆β ∈ Σ. Thus v ∆β. Hence, u β.
The next lemma is clear:
The following properties are true for every w, v ∈ W :
Now we can transform our filtered structure into an brIML1-model -by introducing valuation.
It is easy to check that V Σ is monotone with respect to ≤ Σ (for propositional variables and then, by induction, for all formulas). Now we can prove the crucial theorem:
Theorem 5.4. The following equivalence holds for each w ∈ W and every α ∈ Σ:
Proof. The proof goes by the standard induction on the construction of α. Let us check the most important cases:
. Now we can say that
On the other side, assume that [w] 
means that acceptation of an arbitrary formula from Σ in w implies its acceptation in v. In particular, this condition holds when w ≤ v. For this reason, we can write that w α. Finally, we can sum up our investigations in the conclusion below:
α
Theorem 5.5. Intuitonistic modal logic IML1 has finite model property and thus is decidable. In other words, it means that mono-modal intuitionistic system KT has finite model property with respect to the class of bi-relational brIML1-models.
Of course the same conclusion holds for nNML1-models.
Additional connectives
Here we introduce functors announced earlier. Surely we have ⊥, so ∼ can be derived from -but for transparency we introduce it also directly. Lemma 6.1. We can eliminate ∼ and if we accept the following restriction:
More precisely, in the presence of T -condition we can say that:
Proof. ⇒
Suppose that there exists nIML1-model with T -condition such that for certain w ∈ W we have:
w ϕ ψ but w ∆(ϕ → ψ). It means that for each v ∈ N w , v ϕ or v ψ. But at the same time there exists u ∈ N w such that u ϕ → ψ. So there is z ∈ N u such that z ϕ and z ψ.
But this is impossible because N u ⊆ N w .
⇐
This direction is obvious: it is clear that if we have ϕ → ψ in each point of N w then we have ϕ ψ at least in w.
Now we can introduce the notion of nIML2-model (i.e. nIML1 with T -condition). Note that we can say that nIML2-models are distinguished from nIML1-models by the formula ϕ ψ → ∆(ϕ → ψ) which holds in the former structures and not in the latter. Alternatively, we can use
Note the following lemma:
Lemma 6.2. Canonical nIML1-model validates T -condition (without introducing any new axioms on the syntactical side)
Proof. Assume that we have (prime) theories v and w such that v ∈ N w . It means that if ∆ϕ belongs to w, then ϕ is in v (for every formula ϕ). Suppose now that N v N w . Thus, we have certain u such that u ∈ N v and u / ∈ N w . Hence, v ⊆ u and we can find at least one formula γ such that ∆γ ∈ w but γ / ∈ u. On the other hand, γ ∈ v. But v ⊆ u, as we said -so we have clear contradiction.
The last lemma is important. In fact, it says that IML1 system is complete with respect to nIML2-frames. Moreover, similar reasoning (in terms of bi-relational structures) can be repeated in filtered model. Thus, we have finite model property w.r.t. brIML2-frames.
It should be added that Bozic and Dosen also distinguished T -condition (and proved completeness directly in bi-relational setting). In their terminology, brIML2-frames are strictly condensed frames.
Bisimulation and congenial notions
The notions of bounded morphism and bisimulation are well-known and widely used by researchers working with relational (Kripke) or neighborhood models. In this chapter we show how those tools can be used in our environment (see also [4] for comparison). Note that in the fourth subsection our new connective becomes really necessary.
Bounded morphisms
is a bounded morphism from M 1 to M 2 if for any w ∈ W these restrictions are satisfied:
1. for every q ∈ P V we have w M 1 q ⇔ f (w) M 2 q. This means that w and f (w) satisfy the same propositional variables.
Now we can prove the following theorem:
is a bounded morphism from M 1 to M 2 then for each formula ϕ and each w ∈ W 1 the following holds:
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of formulas. The first case (propositional letters) is obvious. Also ∧ and ∨ are quite simple. Implication cases (→ and ) are only slightly more complicated. In general, we can repeat the reasoning of Moniri and Maleki.
γ := ϕ → ψ
It is sufficient to show that
⇒ Assume that y ∈ N ⇐ This direction is similar and it starts with an assumption that x ∈ N 1 w .
γ := ϕ ψ
Here we can repeat reasoning for → but of course we must remember that now we are working with maximal (not minimal) neighborhoods.
γ := ∆ϕ
Assume that w M 1 ∆ϕ. Hence N 1 w ⊆ {v ∈ W 1 ; v M 1 ϕ}. We want to show that
Thus, by induction hypothesis we have f (x) = y M 2 ϕ. Now we can say that f (w) M 2 ∆ϕ.
Just as in the case of implication, the other direction is very similar. We suppose that f (w) M 2 ∆ϕ and then we must show that N 1 w ⊆ {v ∈ W 1 ; v M 1 ϕ}.
Behavioral equivalence
There is one interesting notion related to bounded morphisms (see [6] ). We define it below: Definition 7.2. Suppose that we have two nIML1-models
We say that worlds w 1 ∈ W 1 and w 2 ∈ W 2 are behaviorally equivalent if there exists nIML1-model B = W B , N B , V B and bounded morphisms f : M 1 → B and g : M 2 → B such that f (w 1 ) = g(w 2 ).
Figure 2: Behavioral equivalence
This idea has been depicted on Fig. 2 . It is not surprising that the following theorem holds:
If w 1 ∈ W 1 and w 2 ∈ W 2 are behaviorally equivalent, then for each ϕ we have:
Proof. 1. For every q ∈ P V :
there is x ∈ N such that xRy
As we could expect, the following theorem holds:
be two nIML1-models with a bisimulation R between them. Then w 1 Rw 2 implies that w 1 and w 2 force the same formulas.
Proof. The propositional case is obvious. Also ∧ and ∨ are not difficult. What is important, is to show that our theorem holds for both implications and ∆. The converse direction (starting from the assumption that w 2 M 2 γ) is almost identical. Of course, we must use adequate conditions concerning relationships between minimal neighborhoods of both models.
γ := ϕ ψ
This reasoning is very similar to the one presented above but with respect to maximal (not minimal) neighborhoods. Similar reasoning is adequate if we start from the assumption that w 2 M 2 γ.
The notion of n-bisimulation
This section is probably more complex and not so obvious. At first, we introduce the notion of the degree of formulas, following Moniri and Maleki but also expanding their basic definition.
Definition 7.4. The degree of formulas is defined as follows: such that xR i y.
such that xR i y;
The following theorem holds (see [4] ):
Theorem 7.4. Let Π be a finite set of propositional variables. Assume that M 1 and M 2 are nIML1-models for language of Π. Then for each w 1 ∈ M 1 and w 2 ∈ M 2 the following conditions are equivalent:
1. w 1 and w 2 are n-bisimilar 2. w 1 and w 2 agree on all propositional formulas of degree at most n.
Proof. ⇒
This part of the proof goes by induction on n. The case n = 0 is obvious. Assume that w 1 and w 2 are n-bisimilar. Consider the set Γ . Note that our set of propositional letters is finite so for any n we have (up to logical equivalence) only finitely many formulas of degree at most n.
Analogously, for w 2 we can consider Θ 2 . Our aim is to show that Θ 2 is satisfied by w 1 and Θ 1 is true in w 2 .
Assume now that deg(Θ 1 ) = n + 1. Then Θ 1 is a Boolean combination of propositional letters and formulas of the form:
Clearly, it is sufficient to show that if γ has one of the forms mentioned above then w 1 M 1 γ implies that w 2 M 2 γ.
Suppose that w
Take y ∈ N 2 w 2 and suppose that y M 2 ϕ. Because of n-bisimulation (clause 3 of Def. 7.5)
we can find x ∈ N 1 w 1
such that xR n y. By assumption deg(ϕ) ≤ n. Hence (by induction hypothesis) x M 1 ϕ. Then x M 1 ψ which gives us (again by induction hypothesis) that y M 2 ψ. This is our expected result.
The converse direction is very similar although we must use clause 5 of Def. 7.5.
2. Similar reasoning as above can be repeated for γ := ϕ ψ. Of course now we need to use adequate clauses for maximal neighborhoods. So suppose that w 1 M 1 ϕ ψ. We want to obtain the following result: that N
and suppose that y M 2 ϕ. Now we use clause 4 of Def. 7.5. to find x ∈ N 1 w 1
such that xR n y. By assumption deg(ϕ) ≤ n. Hence x M 1 ϕ and then x M 1 ψ. This gives us that
The other direction is almost identical. However, me must use clause 6 of Def. 7.5. One can easily see that the converse direction, starting from the assumption that w 2 M 2 ∆ϕ -is completely analogous.
⇐
Suppose that w 1 and w 2 agree on all propositional formulas of degree at most n. In general,
we repeat the main idea of Moniri and Maleki -but we must adapt it to our additional clauses, connected with maximal neighborhoods.
At first, let us define the following sequence of relations:
We see that R n ⊆ R n−1 ⊆ ... ⊆ R 0 , as expected. Now we must check specific conditions of n-bisimulation. there is formula ϕ x , deg(ϕ x ) ≤ i for which:
Let Γ be the set of all such ϕ x . This set is (up to equivalence) finite. Now let us consider two subsets of Γ:
Now we define the following formula (of degree not bigger than i + 1):
This is contradiction because deg(∼ Θ) ≤ i + 1.
Now assume that Γ 0 = ∅ and Γ 1 = ∅. Consider
Now consider the third possibility:
Those considerations refer to clause 4 but solution for clause 6 is of course very similar; the only thing is to remember about proper notation.
Various frame conditions
Fischer Servi introduced (see [9] ) two important conditions which connect preorder ≤ with modal relation R in bi-relational frame for intutionistic modal logic: The same for z = u. If z = v, then v / ∈ N u , i.e. ¬uRv. So F1 does not hold in our semantics. Now let us think about such frame:
{v, u} and for u its maximal (and minimal) neighborhood is just {u}. We can say that wRv because
Let us check it. Take z = w, we see that u / ∈ N w , thus ¬(wRu). If z = v, then v / ∈ N w . The same holds for z = u. Thus F2 fails.
We can say that T -condition implies F2. In fact, we can always use w as our expected z.
Moreover, in our environment both conditions are equivalent. Suppose that we have nIML1-model with F2 but T does not hold. So we have v, w ∈ W such that v ∈ N w but N v N w . Thus there is u ∈ N v which does not belong to N w . But then (by F2) there exists z ∈ N w such that u ∈ N z . By ∆-condition N z ⊆ N w . Now u ∈ N w . This is contradiction. As we can see, ∆-condition was used.
What is the meaning of F1? In Fischer Servi systems it assures us that monotonicity of forcing holds. In fact, it allows us to say that forcing of possibility is satisfied. Monotonicity of necessity is contained in the very definition of forcing. In our terms it would be:
Our solution is different. We use much more simple definition of necessity but we must pay for it, assuming ∆-condition in our frames. Note that in the presence of ∆-condition and ∆ become equivalent. As for possibility, we will discuss it in the next chapter. However, we can already say that F1 will be adopted (at least in basic case).
Plotkin and Stirling in [7] discuss also two additional clauses which are less popular. We present them already in our neighborhood language.
1. PS1. If v ∈ N w and u ∈ N v , then there is z ∈ W such that z ∈ N w and u ∈ N z .
This clause is always satisfied in nIML1-models. In fact, we can always take u as z. Surely, u ∈ N w (by ∆-condition) and u ∈ N u .
PS2.
If v ∈ N w and v ∈ N u then there is z ∈ W such that w ∈ N z and u ∈ N z .
This clause is not true. Check the following counter-frame: W = {w, v, u}, N w = N w = {w, v}, N v = N v = {v}, N u = {u} and N u = {u, v}. Now: w ∈ N w and v ∈ N u but there is not any world which could be z. It is because u / ∈ N w , u / ∈ N v and w / ∈ N v .
9 Possibility operators 9.1 Various possibilities of possibility IML1-logic has been defined as mono-modal, i.e. in a simple language containing only one modal operator∆. For such system we proved (among other properties) semantical completeness. Now the question is: how we can define possibility operator in neighborhood framework, preserving intuitionistic aspect of our logic? Basically, we can use the following definition:
The problem is that such operator violates monotonicity of forcing (which is essential for intuitionism). One can easily find an example of the following situation: that w ∇ϕ, v ∈ N w and v ∇ϕ. We must remember that ∆-condition guarantees monotonicity only for necessity operator.
The simplest way to obtain expected property for ∇ is to use F1-condition, described in the previous section. For convenience, we can introduce the notion of nIML1-F1-frame (model).
Lemma 9.1. In nIL1-F1-model w ∇ϕ implies that u ∇ϕ for every u ∈ N w .
Proof. At first, let us rewrite F1 in terms of neighborhood structures: if u ∈ N w and v ∈ N w , then there exists z ∈ W such that z ∈ N u and z ∈ N v .
Assume now that w ∇ϕ. Thus there exists certain v ∈ N w such that v ϕ. Suppose that u ∈ N w . Our frame satisfies F1, so we have z defined as earlier. Because z ∈ N v , it satisfies ϕ -and because it belongs to N u , we can say that u ∇ϕ.
We can list few axioms which are satisfied in our structures:
Bozic and Dosen showed in [1] how to establish completeness result for certain extension of IML1 (with possibility operator defined as our ∇) -but with respect to the very specific class of bi-relational frames. In fact, they must satisfy the following conditions: i) ≤ R = R ≤= R and ii)
Another interesting clause has been proposed by Wijesekera in [11] . In our language it would be (let us use provisional symbol ♦):
there exists y such that y ∈ N x and y ϕ}.
This approach is important at least for two reasons:
1. We can easily prove that forcing of ♦ϕ is monotone with respect to minimal neighborhoods even without F1. Suppose that w ♦ϕ and take an arbitrary v ∈ N w . As we know, N v ⊆ N w which clearly leads us to expected conclusion. Moreover, the original Wijesekera's system is interesting because if we add the Law of Excluded
Middle to it's axioms, we will not get classical modal logic with standard duality between necessity and possibility (see Simpson [9] ).
There is also third interesting "possibility of possibility". Simpson in [9] assigns it to the unpublished paper of Plotkin and Stirling. At first, this definition looks strange (we present it in our neighborhood language, also we use new provisional symbol ♥):
What is surprising, is the fact that we make "step back" from w to our expected u. Thus, we say that w is seen (intuitionistically) from u. Note, however, that such approach guarantees us monotonicity of forcing (because of →-condition) -so we do not need F1 and we can stay with our basic nIML1-structures.
In fact, the real problem with ♦ and ♥ (defined as above) is rather philosophical than mathematical. They are quite too far from our simple intuition of possibility which says (hopefully, the reader will agree) that satisfaction of a given formula ϕ at least in one point of the range assigned to w (e.g. in N w ) suffices to say that ϕ is possible in w. Moreover, in case of ♥ we do not expect modal reachability of v from w. Thus, we accept strange situation in which w does not see v (by no means) but "believes" u that u sees acceptance of ϕ somewhere in its own maximal neighborhood (i.e. in modal sense).
U-condition
Having ∇ we can investigate an interesting restriction, named U -condition:
Lemma 9.2. In nIML1-F1-model U -condition is characterized by ¬(ϕ ∧ ∇¬ϕ).
Proof. Suppose that we do not have U -condition. Then take W = {w, u},
. It is because we have an element of minimal w-neighborhood (in fact, w itself) which forces ϕ ∧ ∇¬ϕ. The right part of this conjunction is forced because there is u ∈ N w such that u ¬ϕ.
Now assume U -condition. Suppose that there is w ∈ W such that w ¬(ϕ ∧ ∇¬ϕ). Then there is v ∈ N w for which conjunction in brackets holds. Then there exists u ∈ N v such that
Contradiction.
Question of duality
A natural question arises: what about duality between ∆ and ∇? We can prove some general results:
Lemma 9.3. ∆ is not definable in terms of other connectives.
Proof. At first, consider two nIML1-F1-models which are shown below: Figure 5 : ∆ is not definable by ∇ and other operators
We can prove that for each ϕ which does not contain ∆ the following equivalence holds:
The proof goes by induction on the complexity of formula.
For propositional letters we have:
and disjunction are simple.
For implication we can write: At this moment we can repeat earlier reasoning.
The crucial thing is that w M 1 ∆α but w M 2 ∆α (because u does not accept α and u ∈ N 2 w ).
Note that the last counter-model shows us also that is not definable by standard connectives:
w M 1 α and w M 2 α because of u. By we understand arbitrary tautology of L1-F1-logic.
Lemma 9.4. ∇ is not definable in terms of other connectives.
Proof. Consider two nIML1-F1-models which are shown below: Figure 6 : ∇ is not definable by ∆ and other operators
We can prove that for each ϕ which does not contain ∇ the following equivalence holds:
The proof goes by induction on the complexity of formula. Propositional case is easy, the same can be said about ∧, ∨ and →. What about ∆? Check the following sequence of meta-equivalences:
We used induction hypothesis and the fact that u is in minimal v-neighborhood -thus acceptation of certain formula in v implies its acceptation in u. Now think about ∇-case. Obviously,
One detail should be noted: it turns out that if we accept T -condition, then ¬∆¬ϕ → ∇ϕ Attention: in the previous chapter we proved that in our setting (i.e. in the presence of ∆-condition) T -condition and F2 are equivalent. Thus, nIML2-F1-frame can be considered as nIML1-F1-F2-frame. Hence, nIML2-F1-frames are just subclass of Fischer-Servi structures -but satisfying ∆-condition (which is quite strong).
Simpson says in [9] that F2 condition means exactly that formulas such as ¬♦ϕ → ∆¬ϕ hold. In our language it would be ¬∇ϕ → ∆¬ϕ. Note that this formula is equivalent to ∼ ϕ → ∆¬ϕ (which was mentioned in chapter 6).
Some topological issues
One can easily see that our neighborhood structure does not form a topology, i.e. we cannot treat This leads us to the following definition:
Definition 10.1. We say that set X ⊆ W is w-open iff X ⊆ N w and for every v ∈ X we have
But almost immediately we have first problem. Think about X = N w . We want it to be open. It is because we treat this set as our 'relative universe', as the whole space. It is obvious that X ⊆ N w but we do not have any guarantee (in general case) that N v ⊆ X for every v ∈ X.
We must use 'brute force' and assume that we consider only topologically suitable models. In fact, such models must be nIML2-models, i.e. satisfy T -condition. Recall this restriction: if v ∈ N w then N v ⊆ N w . It is obvious that it is useful for our needs. Also, it is possible to formulate it in different but equivalent way -just as it was with →-and ∆-conditions. Lemma 10.1. This condition:
Proof. Suppose that u ∈ N w . Of course N w ⊆ N w and then (by our assumption)
Lemma 10.2. T-condition implies the following:
Proof. Take r ∈ W and assume that N r ⊆ X ⊆ W . Now consider Y = {z ∈ W ; N z ⊆ X}.
Suppose that N r Y , so there exists certain s ∈ N r that s / ∈ Y . But this gives us that N s X, so there is p ∈ N s such that p / ∈ X. But if s ∈ N r then N s ⊆ N r ⊆ X. Then we have that p ∈ X -and this is contradiction.
Now let us check our definition of topology.
Theorem 10.1. Assume that we have suitable neighborhood model W, N , V . Then U w is a topological space for every w ∈ W .
Proof. Let us check standard properties of well-defined topology.
1. Take empty set. We can say that ∅ ∈ U w because ∅ ⊆ N w and the second condition is also true because there are no any v in ∅.
2. Consider the whole 'relative universe', i.e. N w . Clearly this set is contained in itself and from topological suitability we have that for every v ∈ N w the second condition holds:
3. Consider X ⊆ U w . We show that X ∈ U w . The first condition is simple: every element of X belongs to U w so it is contained in N w . The same holds of course for intersection of all such elements. Now let v ∈ X . By the definition we have that N v ⊆ X for every X ∈ X . Then
4. In the last case we deal with arbitrary unions. Suppose that X ⊆ U w and consider X .
Surely this union is contained in N w . Now let us take an arbitrary v ∈ X . We know that N v ⊆ X for some X ∈ X (in fact, it holds for every X which contains v). Then clearly
Note that for every w ∈ W U w is an Alexandroff space, i. 11 Certain classical cases
Basic definitions
In this section our approach to structures introduced earlier can be described as classical. It means that we use axioms of classical propositional calculus (CPC) as our syntactic foundation -and we do not expect monotonicity of forcing in model. On the other hand, we introduce two modal operators:
the first is just like ∆ (e.g. it refers to satisfaction of formula in the whole maximal neighborhood), the second one describes forcing in minimal neighborhood. Thus, it is like . In fact, we even use this symbol. As we remember, w ϕ means -in classical neighborhood semantics -that there exists certain X ∈ N w such that X ϕ. But if N w ∈ N w , then it is equivalent to say that N w ϕ.
Definition 11.1. Our basic structure is a nCL1-frame for CL1 logic. Such frame is defined as an ordered pair W, N where:
2. N is a function from W into P (P (W )) such that:
(a) w ∈ N w
Proof. (sketch) The proof goes by the induction over the complexity of formulas. We have two really important cases: ∆ and . But each of them can be provided almost exactly like proof for ∆ in case of nIML1 models and IML1 logic. In particular, it means that for ⇒-cases we must use ∆ −1 w (resp. −1 w) set and extension lemma. The other side is obvious: if w ϕ (resp. w ∆ϕ)
then there is v ∈ N w (resp. v ∈ N w ) such that v ϕ. By induction, ϕ / ∈ v. But now, if we assume that ∆ϕ (resp. ϕ) belongs to w then we obtain clear contradiction with the very definition of maximal (minimal) neighborhood in canonical model.
Additional conditions
Now let us assume that we accept certain restriction on the frame -named earlier ∆-condition:
v ∈ N w ⇒ N v ⊆ N w . We say that nCL1-models with this property are nCL2-models.
Corresponding logic is of course CL2.
In intuitionistic case, ∆-condition was immediately satisfied in canonical model because minimal neighborhood of theory was just collection of its super-theories. In classical case with modality (but without preservation of forcing) we must add new axiom: ∆ϕ → ∆ϕ. It is not satisfied in standard nCL1-model (just recall counter-model from the section about importance of ∆-condition;
here reasoning can be similar). Let us check it in case of canonical nCL2-model:
Lemma 11.2. Canonical nCL2 model satisfies ∆-condition.
Proof. Suppose that v ∈ N w and that N v N w . Hence, we have z ∈ N v such that for certain ϕ, ∆ϕ ∈ w but ϕ / ∈ v. Note, however, that if ∆ϕ ∈ w then ∆ϕ ∈ w. Thus ∆ϕ ∈ v (because v is in minimal w-neighborhood) and from that ϕ ∈ z (because z is in maximal v-neighborhood).
Contradiction.
Now we can say that CL2 is complete with respect to the class of all nCL2-frames. What about T -condition, introduced in our intuitionistic investigations? Consider the following axiom:
∆ϕ → ∆ ϕ. It is not satisfied in nCL1 or nCL2 model. It becomes true when we limit ourselves to the class of nCL3-frames (models), i.e. those which validate T -condition (but not necessarily ∆-condition). Let us check that the canonical model for corresponding CL3-logic satisfies this restriction.
Lemma 11.3. Canonical nCL3 satisfies T -condition, i.e. v ∈ N w ⇒ N v ⊆ N w .
Proof. Suppose that v ∈ N w and z ∈ N v . If ∆ϕ ∈ w, then (by the newly introduced axiom and modus ponens) ∆ ϕ ∈ w. This gives us that ϕ ∈ v and then ϕ ∈ z (because z is in minimal
It is easy to show that this model is actually nCML2.4. Thus we can show that for each γ ∈ IML1 and each v ∈ W we have:
For propositional variables:
v q * ⇔ v q ⇔ N v ⊆ {u ∈ W ; u q} ⇔ N v ⊆ {u ∈ W ; u q} ⇔ v q (recal that intuitionism preserves monotonicity of forcing w.r.t. minimal neighborhoods).
Cases of conjunction and disjunction are easy (by induction). Now suppose that γ := ξ → δ.
Then:
v γ * ⇔ v (ξ * → δ * ) ⇔ N v ⊆ {u ∈ W ; u ξ * or u δ * } ⇔ N v ⊆ {u ∈ W ; u ξ or u δ} ⇔ v ξ → δ ⇔ v γ.
For γ := ∆ξ the reasoning is similar, even shorter (recall that (∆ξ) * = ∆ξ).
Finally, we have classical model validating the same formulas as M . Thus, if w ϕ, then w ϕ * , where w ∈ W . Contradiction, because we assumed that ϕ * is nCL2.4-tautology.
It is obvious that if we add ∆ϕ → ∆∆ϕ to IML1 then our function * will become translation between this extended version of IML1 and the system CL2.4.5.
